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Executive Summary 
 This research examines the interactions of stakeholders (e.g. landlords, 
property managers, housing officials, inspectors, etc.) from the point of view of 
several housing advocates and landlords working in the HCVP in City of 
Pasadena, CA. I seek to answer how they impact tenant outcomes for voucher 
recipients. Since housing discrimination still persists in other forms, the 
perspectives of housing advocates who directly work with landlords and voucher 
households become important in understanding more about stakeholder 
relationships. Their unique perspectives, focusing on both the personal and the 
structural, make their voices tremendously important in analyzing the housing 
actions and approaches taken on by landlords. With the high number of low-
income households that struggle to find affordable and decent housing, the HCVP 
only solves a part of the problem. This research uses the City of Pasadena as a 
case study for the continually increasing number of overburdened low-income 
households and consequent turnover to chronic homelessness.  
 I use examples of fair housing ordinances, the Fair Housing Act, and 
administration of the HCVP in other cities to establish examples of forms of 
discrimination based on race and income. In addition, some of these examples 
show examples of local Public Housing Authorities that were successful in their 
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administration of housing choice vouchers. Overall, these examples serve to show 
that tenant outcomes are influenced by discrimination based on not only race but 
also one’s source of income. These findings contextualize the significance of 
stakeholders in causing tenant outcomes.  
 The case study on the City of Pasadena provides context for rent 
overburden and housing shortage. Furthermore, a section of the case study 
includes considerations for the impact that new administrative and budget 
changes to the U.S. Depart of Housing and Urban Development. As the Trump 
Administration has released its preliminary 2018 budget blueprint, there will be a 
stark rise in unwanted concerns for the future of the HCVP and other housing 
assistance programs.  
 My findings focus on the roles of stakeholders in the processes of 
administering the HCVP. Moreover, I use the perspectives of landlords and 
housing advocates in order to examine the relationships of stakeholders in these 
processes. Given the perspective of housing advocates in their personal 
experiences in working with landlords, voucher recipients, and housing officials, 
how do stakeholder interactions influence voucher households directly? There 
are four ways in which I identified how stakeholder interactions influence 
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household outcomes: voucher household selection, roles of HCVP stakeholders, 
responses to tenant behavior, and expectations for the future of the HCVP. 
 In response to these findings, recommendations for the City of Pasadena 
are presented with consideration for voucher household outcomes and the 
expectations for the future of the HCVP. The primary recommendation for 
addressing voucher households that face housing discrimination based on race 
and income requires more support from not only the private sector but also 
housing advocacy groups. Consequently, housing advocates can help to form 
more transparent and favorable relationships between stakeholders through 
housing services and active outreach. These recommendations may allow for 
landlord exposure to the HCVP and administrative burdens to be minimized in 
their impacts on voucher tenant outcomes.  
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Introduction 
In a housing market that demands more affordability than it can supply to 
its residents, it is no surprise that on any given night in Los Angeles County 
47,000 people live without a roof over their heads (HUD 2016). This lack of 
housing affordability coincides with the reconcentration of dense urban areas, 
leaving a small number of alternatives for low-income families. More often than 
not, these families have no other options than to move into neighborhoods with 
high levels of poverty and a lack of access to good schools and safe, decent, and 
affordable housing (CFED 2017). The state of California has the highest rate of 
unsheltered homelessness in the nation and Los Angeles County has the second 
highest population of homeless people amongst U.S. metropolitan cities (U.S. 
Census 2010). As the homelessness problem in Los Angeles raises extreme issues 
for public safety, the magnitude and severity of the problem is too overwhelming 
for city and county efforts to appropriately provide assistance to those in need 
and to support efforts to deconcentrate neighborhoods with high levels of 
poverty.  
Such efforts, on the other hand, may be difficult to accomplish. With 
consideration of the new presidential administration recently set in place, there 
will likely be challenges to solve issues of poverty and homelessness in our 
communities. The announcement of HUD’s new secretary, Ben Carson, carries 
with him important questions to the future of housing subsidy programs. 
Moreover, Sarah Edelman, the director of policy for the Center for American 
Progress said:  
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The two biggest risks I see with a Carson administration are 1) that 
HUD sits on the sidelines, allowing Congress to chop funds for 
affordable housing, while our nation’s housing problems get 
worse and 2) HUD abdicates responsibility for enforcing the Fair 
Housing Act, which would leave women, families with children, 
people with disabilities, and people of color less defended against a 
landlord or mortgage lender who discriminates against them and 
stall important economic mobility work (The Nation 2).  
Given these challenges, the complex layers of issues that make up the shortage of 
affordable housing in our nation may worsen before an effective strategy can be 
implemented to facilitate and maintain decent and affordable housing.  
The challenges that HUD face in providing more affordable housing for 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty include discrimination in the 
housing voucher market. The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination 
when people are renting, buying, or securing financing for any housing. The 
prohibitions specifically cover discrimination in different forms: race, national 
origin, religion, gender, sex, disability and the presence of children. For both the 
sale/rental of housing and mortgage lending, the Fair Housing Act prohibits 
racially discriminatory actions that hinder the access to affordable homes for 
those who are eligible. For example, actions from landlords such as making 
housing unavailable, refusing to negotiate, and providing different housing 
services or facilities to tenants violate legislation. In response to these systemic 
issues, HUD implemented new programs such as the (Section 8) Housing Choice 
Voucher Program (HCVP) with intentions of reducing the number of cases of 
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segregation and discrimination in public housing. However, the program 
developed into a way for discrimination in many forms to further permeate 
throughout communities in America despite the purpose of the Fair Housing Act. 
“The bureaucratic-sounding federal program, Section 8 (later called the HCVP), 
became a racially coded put-down,” says Emily Badger of the Washington Post. 
The federally funded program called the HCVP provides local housing authorities 
the ability to provide housing assistance in the private market for the elderly, 
disabled, and very low-income families to find decent, safe, sanitary, and 
affordable housing. HUD designed the housing program for low-income 
households to move into any neighborhood as long as the participants qualify for 
the eligibility requirements of the program. As there are many ways for low-
income families to experience some form of housing discrimination or 
segregation in their participation in the program, this research paper examines 
the themes such as the implications of choice, fair housing, and the different roles 
of participants of the voucher program through a focus on Pasadena, CA.   
Housing discrimination continued to pervade throughout public housing 
projects and cities at the introduction of Housing Choice vouchers as a branch of 
the Section 8 housing program in the late 1990s. The financial freedom to live 
where they want, the implication of “choice” for qualifying low-income 
households had not been fully enforced, as segregation and racial discrimination 
pervaded across the U.S.; as a result, landlords continued to legally maintain the 
right to refuse housing to recipients of housing choice vouchers. Though federal 
fair housing ordinances including the Fair Housing Act were established to 
prohibit discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, religion, 
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familial status, and disability, housing discrimination doesn’t have to be explicitly 
racially motivated to be considered illegal (CFED 2017). Many households who 
relied on their vouchers became subject to applying them in the same high 
poverty neighborhoods from which they sought to move away. Vale notes, “The 
assumption built into the [voucher subsidy] is that the people who need it the 
most have developed a moral failing that they are incapable of attaining housing 
for their families” (2015). In other words, assumptions about voucher recipients 
were based on the fact that they required federal government subsidies in order 
to provide for their families. Consequently, these assumptions developed into 
stereotypes reflecting that voucher recipients have morally failed in not bringing 
home a sufficient source of income and food for the household. Some landlords 
and developers comprehend this moral failing as a red flag or a sign of potential 
risk to the surrounding neighborhoods and their property. 
While other studies focus on identifying the general determinants of the 
spatial locations of voucher households, this study emphasizes the perspectives of 
landlords, housing authority staff, and housing advocates of the City of Pasadena 
and the County of Los Angeles in a larger conversation about the program’s 
design and administration. In regards to policy, the lack of information regarding 
rental housing is particularly evident. As policy debate has focused largely on 
whether supply-side or demand-side interventions are more effective in 
providing affordable housing for low-income households, findings show that 
demand-side strategies are more effective (Apgar, 1990; Galster, 1997). 
Moreover, political support and federal funding have followed these findings. 
Therefore, the abundance of bodies of literature on the associations between 
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“housing market actors” (or those who have an economic and social impact on 
the housing market such as landlords and property owners) and housing 
discrimination in combination with the lack of literature on housing supply and 
regulation suggest the significance of understanding the perspectives and actions 
of these market actors. In understanding these perspectives, this study is 
centered on landlord behavior and interactions in relation to voucher household 
outcomes.  
Moreover, I examine landlord actions and perspectives in order to better 
understand the housing outcomes that are broadly observed in other housing 
studies. These actions and perspectives “emphasize the ways in which the 
sociological qualities of real estate make conventional market reasoning 
especially inappropriate for understanding how social relations are ordered 
around real estate” (Logan & Molotch, 1987). In other words, I aim to connect the 
actions of stakeholders in the HCVP (e.g. market actors and housing officials) to 
the kinds of opportunities that are available to voucher holders.  
 
 
Background 
Housing Choice Voucher Program History and Timeline 
Before HUD established the current public housing voucher program, the 
U.S. Housing Act of 1937 had allowed for local PHAs to be set up by each state. 
Local PHAs became the primary source of housing assistance for about 30 years. 
Because of the federal government’s emphasis on job creation and elimination of 
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highly concentrated neighborhoods consisting of informal urban settlements 
during the Depression era, local PHAs began a public housing program using a 
strategy that focused on producing affordable homes for low-income families 
(HUD, 2001, Section 1-1). This strategy consisted of local PHAs solely owning and 
managing the public housing properties. Local PHAs consequently became the 
primary source of housing assistance for low-income households for about 30 
years. However, HUD’s strategy for housing assistance moved towards 
involvement from the private sector. In 1965, HUD implemented the Section 23 
program which became the first PHA administered housing program to use 
privately owned housing (HUD, 2001, Section 1-2). This program allowed for 
local PHAs to lease units from private owners and then sublease the units to low-
income families. Though privately owned properties were involved in HUD’s 
strategy for financial assistance to these households, PHAs maintained the 
primary responsibilities of the program: tenant selection, rent collection, and 
management/maintenance.  
In 1968, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (otherwise known as the Housing Act 
of 1968) created the Section 235 homeownership program and Section 236 rental 
program to strengthen the shift towards using subsidies in privately developed, 
privately owned housing for public housing (HUD, 2001, Section 1-2). While the 
Housing Act of 1968 included provisions on housing discrimination, it led to the 
most comprehensive social program trial ever conducted by the federal 
government. This trial was called Experimental Housing Allowance Program 
(EHAP); it has been considered to be the earliest form of a federal tenant-based 
subsidy. During a nine-year period, about 50,000 low-income households 
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received financial assistance to lease units directly from property owners at two 
trial sites (HUD, 2001, Section 1-2). At the conclusion of this program trial, HUD 
revealed in their findings that 1) encouraging property repairs and maintenance 
in a housing allowance program could preserve the existing housing supply; 2) 
creating household mobility allowed for households to choose more safe, decent 
neighborhoods; and 3) households did not choose expensive units and were able 
to pay for their portion of rent in their units of choice (HUD, 2001, Section 1-2). 
With positive findings from the EHAP, the shift in federal housing strategy from 
locally owned public housing to privately owned rental housing became enacted 
into federal legislation called the Housing and Community Development Act of 
1974. This law allowed for housing assistance such as grants, loans, and contracts 
to be provided in the form of funds or services of federal personnel. As a result, 
the Section 23 program was replaced by the Section 8 existing program, which 
required all PHAs to convert to the Section 8 existing program. The Section 8 
existing program became an added component to the Section 8 project-based 
housing assistance. This new housing assistance provided tenant-based subsidies 
as opposed to the subsidization of privately owned property. Households under 
this program had the opportunity to choose their own housing since the tenant-
subsidies followed the households from unit to unit.  
The significance of establishment of the Section 8 existing program was in 
the program’s differences from EHAP. One such difference was that direct 
payments were made to property managers of the selected unit on behalf of the 
household. Therefore, the households under the program did not receive 
payments from PHAs. Another difference included a HUD-established ceiling 
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based on fair market rent; it imposed a cap on the gross rent for a unit. Growing 
in popularity with Congress, local governments, property managers, and low-
income households, the Section 8 existing program was renamed the rental 
certificate program (HUD, 2001, Section 1-3). In October 1998, the rental 
certificate program was then combined with the rental voucher program because 
their different impacts showed positives results for low-income households. For 
example, the certificate program allowed for a choice of housing, anonymity, 
inexpensive, and a community with neighborhoods that did not result in ghettos 
or site selection problems. On the other hand, the voucher program provided 
assistance to households based on their predetermined calculation of assistance 
amount (30% of adjusted income paid towards rent) and did not include a fair 
market rent ceiling. The formal legislation for the combination of the two 
programs was called the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 
(QHWRA). While this legislation removed any features that had different 
statutory requirements, it also mandated the types of subsidies in the program to 
come together into one housing voucher program. As a result, in May 1999, HUD 
issued the Merger of the Certificate and Voucher Programs for the official 
unification of the certificate and voucher programs into the HCVP (HUD, 2001, 
Section 1-2). Additionally, the interim rule included a provision for the certificate 
program to be phased out by October 2001. On October 1, 1999, the HCVP 
became effectively immediately, requiring voucher households to pay at least 
30% of their income towards rent.  
 
General Overview of the Housing Choice Voucher Program  
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The Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP) is a major program 
federally funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) and administered locally through the Public Housing Authorities (PHA) 
of the city and county. The purpose of the program is to provide housing 
assistance in the private market for the elderly, disabled, and very low-income 
families to find decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable housing. In order for 
individuals and families to participate in the program, applicants must fit the 
eligibility requirements set by the PHA. In most local programs, the income of 
voucher holders must not exceed 50% of the median income for the county or 
metropolitan area in which they choose to live. The HCVP mandates that each 
PHA must distribute 75% of its vouchers to applicants whose incomes do not 
exceed 30% of the area’s median income. HUD publishes the median income 
levels varying by location while the PHA of each community provides income 
limits for the area and household size.  
As the name of the program suggests, the HCVP equips voucher holders 
with the freedom to choose any housing that fulfills the requirements of the 
program. Moreover, voucher holders are not limited to housing units situated in 
subsidized housing projects. As voucher holders are responsible for finding a 
suitable housing unit of the holder’s choice, these rental units must fulfill the 
minimum requirements of health and safety set by the PHA. Once the owner of 
the unit agrees to rent it out under the program, the PHA directly pays the 
landlord a subsidy on behalf of the participating voucher holders and then the 
voucher holders pay the difference between the rent charged by the landlord and 
the subsidy provided to the landlord by the PHA.    
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There are different ways in which the program can be administered. Local 
housing authorities will distribute a number of vouchers or rental subsidies to 
tenant families who are eligible. With these types of rental subsidies, voucher 
holders must search for their own housing in which the respective landlord 
accepts their vouchers. Voucher households have the freedom to take their 
voucher where the property owner agrees to rent under the program. While 
landlords directly receive subsidies from the local public housing authority on 
behalf of the voucher household, voucher households pay the difference between 
the rent charged by landlords and the subsidy provided. In a different form of 
administering the program, local housing authorities will subsidize the rents 
themselves of some residential units. This form of assistance is considered 
project-based. For a contractually determined time, HUD provides subsidies for 
the assisted units of a particular mortgaged property. All such subsidies are 
received from HUD under the Section 8 New Construction, Sustainable 
Rehabilitation, and Loan Management Set-Aside Programs (LMSA). For any 
projects that receive notification of selection from HUD for these subsidy 
programs, subsidies will generally be devoted to the project for a single 20 year-
term. As a result, the Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract enforces 
general responsibilities on the property managers of assisted properties: 1) 
leasing to Section 8 eligible households, 2) maintenance and upkeep for decent, 
safe and sanitary housing, 3) nondiscrimination and equal employment 
opportunity requirements, 4) Section 8 reporting, managing and accounting 
requirements, and 5) obtainment of the prior written approval of HUD and the 
contract administrator to any transferring voucher households from the project. 
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The HAP contract is a contractual agreement made between the landlord and the 
local PHA in which HUD provides Section 8 rental subsidies to the property 
managers of selected mortgaged properties if they stay in accordance with the 
HAP contract. HAP contracts are made between local PHAs and landlords but 
they are directed towards subsidizing voucher households rather than subsidizing 
privately mortgaged properties. Violations of HAP contracts committed by the 
property manager in general are considered as a default to thoroughly perform 
the obligations of the HAP contract. Landlords and property managers may 
resolve the issue by fulfilling the obligations that were violated; however, refusal 
to resolve the issue could lead to enforcement actions from HUD. These actions 
include not only reducing, suspending, or ending HAP payments but also taking 
possession of the property or applying to the State or Federal court for the 
voucher household to be received by a new property manager. Though tenant-
based and project-based vouchers are distinct in how subsidies become available 
for low-income households, the relationships and responsibilities between the 
local PHA and property managers remain the same.  
 
The Fair Housing Act and the Housing Choice Voucher Program 
 The Civil Rights Act of 1968 formed legislation to prevent discrimination 
in the housing market. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects programs 
and activities receiving federal financial assistance from discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin. Moreover, the Fair Housing Act (or Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) prohibits discrimination in the selling, 
renting, and financing of homes, as well as in other housing-related transactions 
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based on the sex, race, color, national origin, religion, familial status, and 
disability.  
Despite the significance of these provisions, more than thirty years later, 
minority home seekers still cannot count on getting the same information and 
assistance that comparable whites receive when they visit rental or real estate 
offices to inquire about homes advertised in the newspaper (de Souza Briggs 
2005). As discrimination still continues to impact tenant outcomes, statistics in 
certain counties provide evidence of voucher households continuing to 
experience prejudice. The Urban Institute provides statistics for the 
administration of Alameda County, CA showing that only 18.6% of voucher 
recipients in the area found a unit with their voucher in 2015 (Brunet 2016). 
There were nearly 75,000 units in 2013 and, yet, only around 19,000 units were 
available to extremely low-income voucher holders. Consequently, the spatial 
geography of these voucher households indicates the constant impact of 
discrimination in spite of civil rights efforts.  
 The Fair Housing Act is designed to prohibit housing discrimination 
mainly because of race but it leaves questions for cases when voucher households 
searching for available rental units face discrimination. Because the Fair Housing 
Act does not include specific provisions for voucher households, the incomes of 
voucher tenants and the stereotypes attached to low-income households are 
assumed in their voucher status. Though the Fair Housing Act protects 
individuals and families of color from discriminatory housing practices, certain 
housing policies and landlord actions result in the effects of discrimination 
(LCBH 2002). Effects of discrimination initiated by voucher status are 
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considered “disparate impacts.” Disparate impacts are the discriminatory effects 
of a law or practice that may not have even been motivated by intent to 
discriminate. The distinction between what a policy or practice intended and 
didn’t intend is significant because it is uncommon for landlords or developers to 
admit that a policy or their housing practices carried intentions to marginalize 
low-income households.  
Furthermore, disparate impacts such as discrimination based on source of 
income or voucher status do not have a cause for action under the Fair Housing 
Act. This is the case because the Fair Housing Act does not establish a contextual 
claim for discrimination against voucher holders. An individual’s voucher status 
refers to the socioeconomic status of voucher holders since they represent the 
incomes of those who are eligible and accepted for the program. The Fair 
Housing Act protects classes such as race, familial status, or disability but not 
socioeconomic status. Tamica H. Daniel of Georgetown University Law Center 
explains that socioeconomic discrimination is just another form of housing 
discrimination that Congress and the courts have not addressed (Daniel 2010). 
An example of discrimination in the voucher program includes landlords who 
reject voucher holders because they have a source of income based on public 
subsidies. “Some state and local governments have already implemented 
legislation to prevent source of income discrimination after 2002” but “because 
housing voucher holders are not a protected class under the Fair Housing Act, an 
individual claim for voucher discrimination under the current Act must rest on a 
disparate impact theory” (Daniel, 2010). As there are only some state and local 
governments that have passed laws to prohibit discrimination of socioeconomic 
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status, it becomes important for local Public Housing Authorities to be consistent 
with reducing the discriminatory effects of the voucher program. The federal 
courts of appeals must recognize disparate impact claims for voucher holders 
under the Fair Housing Act before there is a cause for action.  
All federal courts of appeals have permitted claims under the Fair Housing 
Act based on disparate impacts but not the claims on voucher holders. The Fair 
Housing Act or Title VIII was a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and Title VII 
was originally a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Though they are separate 
pieces of legislation, they both share a common purpose: to reduce 
discrimination. This shared goal allowed for the courts to interpret the intentions 
of the Fair Housing Act in the same way that the courts do for the intentions of 
Title VII. Because they have similar goals in preventing discrimination in 
housing, the courts have maintained that Congress also intended to allow for 
plaintiffs to make disparate impact claims under the Federal Housing Act. 
Furthermore, the Fair Housing Act has not specified that disparate impact claims 
can be made under it but its statutory language and developed history provide 
implications that this can be done. The Supreme Court has stated that the text of 
the law is broad and inclusive enough to allow for disparate impact claims. 
Therefore, allowing for disparate impact claims furthers the purpose of the Fair 
Housing Act and Title VII to include a ban on discrimination based on source of 
income or housing voucher status.  
Some courts believe that the history of the establishment of the HCVP 
suggests that Congress would reject disparate impact claims for voucher holders. 
These courts suggest that former versions of the HVCP  emphasize the voluntary 
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nature of the program and that the changes to the program support a 
congressional intent to maintain it voluntary (Daniel 2010). They refer to the 
“take one, take all” provision repealed in 1998 that made landlords participating 
in the voucher program to accept all voucher holders who wanted to rent a unit 
and would be eligible for the program (Daniel 2010). Moreover, the argument for 
why the provision was repealed is that Congress had the intention of getting rid of 
disincentives to landlord participation such as mandating every private landlord 
to actively engage in the program. Even though Congress doesn’t explicitly verify 
that the provision was repealed to make the program more voluntary for 
landlords, some courts suggest that the repeal prevents reconcentration of 
poverty in which voucher holders choose the landlords in neighborhoods with 
high levels of poverty that are accepting all vouchers (Daniel 2010). Whether or 
not Congress intended to emphasize the voluntary nature of the program, the 
anti-discrimination provisions of the Fair Housing Act takes priority over 
voluntary participation. The text of the Fair Housing Act shows the significance 
of reducing housing discrimination while state courts add that the purposes of 
the voucher program to increase the number of households that move from high 
poverty neighborhoods to low poverty neighborhoods are more important than 
voluntary participation.  
Rejecting disparate impact claims for voucher holders under the Fair 
Housing Act creates barriers to their search for safe, decent, and affordable 
housing opportunities. For instance, Daniel notes, “Discrimination against 
voucher recipients can conceal discrimination based on race, familial status or 
disability” (Daniel 2010). In other words, landlords are able to use the voluntary 
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nature of the HCVP as a cover for discriminating against existing protected 
classes of voucher holders. Daniel additionally claims that it is possible for 
segregation and poverty to be reduced when voucher holders are not confined to 
certain buildings and neighborhoods with voucher-unprotected policies (Daniel 
2010). If landlords were not allowed to discriminate against voucher holders, 
adding disparate impact claims would open up a large number of buildings in 
different neighborhoods that are currently closed off to voucher holders.  
 
Access to Housing “Choice” in U.S. cities 
The design of the HCVP causes both positive and negative outcomes. The 
program serves to achieve two primary goals: 1) To uphold HUD’s mission to 
provide safe, decent, and affordable housing and 2) to facilitate household 
residential location choice. Additionally, the voucher program guidebook 
recognizes the larger programmatic “concern about avoiding excessive 
concentrations of housing choice voucher families in high-poverty or minority 
neighborhoods” (HUD, 2001, Section 2-1). Therefore, housing choice is the 
responsibility of voucher households. This responsibility allows for voucher 
households to have the freedom to choose where they want to live as long as the 
fair market rent of the chosen unit complies with the eligibility requirements of 
the local Public Housing Authority. Voucher households are then expected to 
eventually relocate into neighborhoods that hold equitable opportunities for 
households of all income levels.  
Often times, however, voucher households have no other option but to 
choose to live in a neighborhood with high concentrations of poverty. Because 
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landlords and housing authority officials are recognized as having an influence on 
locational outcomes, voucher households end up losing their housing choice. 
Such influence includes discrimination, bureaucratic procedures, shortages in 
vouchers, and long waiting lists. For example, the Chicago Housing Authority 
issued a cut of 14,000 vouchers per year between 2008-2012 in order to pay off 
bond debts, failing to address the more than 114,000 households on its waiting 
list for housing assistance (CTBA 2014). The source of the administrative burden 
associated with portability also includes the initially resource-intensive process of 
paperwork for leasing up and transferring voucher tenants (Greenlee 2011). On 
the landlord side, the willingness of landlords to follow fair housing ordinances 
and accept vouchers is significant to the tenant outcomes. Betsy Shuman-Moore 
at the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights said, “The program requires 
landlords to cooperate… and they are not,” (Reddick 2013). Consequently, the 
housing choice that makes the program so effective is relinquished. The lack of 
housing supply and housing choice in cities brings attention to the failure of local 
PHAs to achieve and protect the primary goals of the HCVP. Existing literature 
on the housing outcomes in the HCVP in cities like Baltimore, Chicago, Oakland, 
and Los Angeles provide evidence for the cause of these locational outcomes.  
 
Barriers to Housing Choice for Housing Choice Voucher Holders 
 The Chicago Housing Authority has implemented the voucher program in 
order to “break up pockets of poverty, integrate low-income families and public 
housing families into mixed-income communities, and improve the quality-of-life 
for these families” (LCBH 2002). With various forms of housing to choose from, 
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low-income families have the freedom to decide where they would like to live, 
rather than go through the process of trying to find affordable housing through 
the private market. However, others believe that the HCVP is actually more 
damaging to neighborhoods as they think that clusters of households under 
public housing “can destabilize neighborhoods, bringing drugs, crime, and 
antisocial behavior and precipitating a cycle of neighborhood disinvestment and 
decline” (Popkin and Cunningham, 1999). Due to a high concentration of voucher 
households, some literature indicates that such concentration may decrease 
neighboring property values. Property values are one way to measure a 
community’s well being. Galster et al. (1999) conducted research in Baltimore 
County neighborhoods, and concluded that larger concentrations of voucher 
households had more of an adverse effect on the community than smaller 
concentrations did (Popkin and Cunningham, 1999). However, the research also 
explains there is the possibility of a faulty correlation between concentrations of 
voucher households and concentrations of low-property value neighborhoods. 
Rather, there may just be an overwhelming concentration of voucher households 
in neighborhoods that are extremely impoverished, unsuccessfully representing 
the population fairly as a whole.  
 
Housing Discrimination Based on Residential Preferences of Landlords 
Because stereotypes about low-income families persist in housing 
practices, the general attitude towards voucher households is negative, and thus, 
landlords feel that they hold the right to turn away future tenants whom they 
believe may have problems with disturbing the neighborhood. Because race and 
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ethnicity play significant roles in housing practices, this can affect why market 
demand is low in areas with concentrations of voucher households. According to 
Turner and Wilson, African Americans mainly make up the minorities of the 
program and generally move towards neighborhoods with high poverty levels 
(Turner, 1999). Farley, Fielding, and Kryson (1997) concluded that since whites 
are hesitant to live in neighborhoods that “they perceive as black or racially 
changing, areas that are most open to minorities may also have the weakest 
property values and be most susceptible to decline,” (Turner, 1999). Low-income 
households are stratified into stereotypes that they are the cause for the declining 
property values in the adjacent neighborhoods, even though most of the 
neighborhood effects can be attributed to housing practices. When landlords 
refuse to tend to the complaints of tenants about damage repairs or terms of the 
lease contracts, such practices more often than not perpetuate the concentration 
of voucher households into neighborhoods of poor conditions. Abandoning the 
well being of the neighborhood for the income/welfare benefits of accepting 
voucher holders, property owners and landlords continue to view voucher 
tenants as detriments to their neighborhoods.  
 
Housing Discrimination Continues Despite Fair Housing Efforts 
In the debate on the positive and negative impacts of the program, an 
internal problem exists in which practices of housing discrimination against 
voucher holders still persist regardless of the local Public Housing Authority’s fair 
housing ordinances (LCBH 2002). In such experiences, some landlords 
expressed they “didn’t want trouble” and had never participated in the program. 
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The decision of these landlords to not rent to tenants who were thought to be 
bringing “trouble” indicates that they associate voucher holders as bad or uncivil 
tenants (Turner 1999). Moreover, other forms of housing discrimination based 
on race, religion, age, and disability also persisted in Chicago. Despite the ruling 
from the 1998 City of Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, which declares it illegal to 
discriminate based on “race, color, sex, age, religion, disability, national origin, 
ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge 
status or source of income,” existing literature provides evidence on housing 
search outcomes in which voucher holders are continually denied housing due to 
their race and income status (LCBH, 2002). In a testing conducted by LCBH, 
data show that income and racial discrimination continues to contribute towards 
housing outcomes in Chicago. A random sample of white testers and minority 
testers were gathered to call landlords, expressing interest in renting out housing 
with their vouchers. In a sample that focused on exception rent areas and 
adjacent neighborhoods, 148 landlords were part of the test and 55% of the 
landlords refused to offer housing and respond “no” to a white phone caller while 
29% responded with “yes” and 16% responded with “other” (LCBH 2002). Then, 
a consecutive test was conducted in order to see whether race and ethnicity were 
discriminatory factors. In a random sample of 25 landlords, 36% responded with 
a “yes,” 16% with a “no,” and 48% with “other,” meaning they did not respond 
back to a follow-up call regarding their answer (LCBH 2002). The tests concluded 
that Housing Choice Voucher holders were restricted from accessing the majority 
of rental units in Chicago due to illegal discrimination. 41,000 voucher families 
were left to choose from 30% of available rental units within the Chicago Housing 
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Authority’s rental payment guidelines (LCBH 2002). The researchers added, 
“once ethnicity is accounted for, the Housing Choice Voucher holder who is 
African-American or Hispanic has an even smaller opportunity or probability of 
locating suitable housing,” (LCBH 2002). If low-income households are further 
prevented from accessing an opportunity to afford safe and decent housing, then 
they will likely have to relocate to neighborhoods with even lower standards of 
living or, even worse, become homeless. Although the voucher program has been 
implemented to assist those in impoverished living conditions, the choices 
offered by the Housing Choice Voucher Program aren’t so abundant at all.  
 
Housing Choice Vouchers in Alameda County vs Los Angeles County 
HCVPs do not always result in discrimination as a study by Varady and 
Walker illustrates the success of Alameda County in Oakland, CA to assist 
voucher tenants move to the suburbs (2003). The study’s literature suggests that 
the spirit of cooperation between the leaders of housing authorities, racial 
tolerance, and the availability of affordable housing contributed to the success of 
the program in such a tight housing market. Though the study shows that HCVPs 
can succeed, it strongly conveys the need for tolerance of racial differences and 
cooperation amongst developers in order for low-income households to be able to 
mobilize into low poverty neighborhoods. Moreover, the study focuses on a more 
contextually affordable market in Alameda County than the market in the Los 
Angeles region. Similar studies conducted in Los Angeles County indicate that the 
locational patterns of voucher households have been quite consistent from 1997-
2002 (Yaquian-Illescas 2004). The findings show that tenant mobility did not 
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increase in Los Angeles County as a result of the HCVP. In addition, the lack of 
support to allow voucher households to gradually gain independence from their 
housing assistance prevents them from accessing neighborhoods of greater 
opportunity. Since over 50% of voucher families rely on wages for at least some of 
their income, those in high poverty neighborhoods tend to lack the economic 
independence to mobilize within a housing shortage (HUD 2003). Because the 
same affordability and cooperation amongst developers and leaders in the Bay 
area do not exist in Los Angeles County, poverty rates in Los Angeles 
neighborhoods have perpetuated. 
 
HUD’s “State of California Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing” 
Meanwhile, HUD’s current fair housing strategy for California is 
represented in its “Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing.” This analysis 
provides a tool for assessment and regulation of local housing market actors (e.g. 
landlords and property managers). HUD emphasizes discrimination by landlords 
in these documents as a continuous issue and provides that landlord outreach 
and education can serve as a means of preventing such prejudice (HUD 2001). 
On the other hand, several obstacles challenge housing authority officials in their 
administration of the HVCP. The role of housing authority officials is to monitor 
spatial patterns of vouchers and to provide outreach to landlords and property 
managers, specifically to those who possess units outside of neighborhoods of 
concentrated poverty and minorities. However, the restrictions in staff resources 
and the high demand for housing assistance have shown to be significant barriers 
to fulfilling their roles as housing providers (HUD 2001). The source of this 
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administrative burden lies in the resource-intensive paperwork for transferring a 
tenant’s residence. Moreover, extensive paperwork is required for each time that 
transferring households either make another transfer soon after arriving to a 
residence or “transfer back” to the same neighborhood in which they once lived 
(Greenlee, 2011). Further administrative burdens stem from the shortages of 
vouchers and housing supply in certain cities in California such as Los Angeles. 
“A HUD report from 1999 stated that one of the longest waiting periods for 
Housing Choice Vouchers was in the City of Los Angeles at an average of 10 
years” (HUD 2001). HUD recognizes and acknowledges that landlords have an 
important role in the spatial patterns of residence of voucher holders but also 
that the administration of vouchers and the state of the housing market play a 
significant role in creating portability for voucher households.  
 
 
Stakeholders in the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program 
While there is a wide range of research on fair housing topics specifically 
focused on the patterns of spatial segregation, there are gaps in literature about 
the roles that landlords play in the HCVP. Most literature focuses on the impact 
that the program has on economic barriers and the classification of race and 
income based on neighborhood value and conditions. These studies on 
neighborhoods are significant because they provide findings on the effects of 
voucher programs that serve to alleviate housing segregation and high 
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concentrations of poverty in neighborhoods. Current literature focuses on two 
main perspectives. Studies on both perspectives show that the searching process 
for housing plays a significant part in establishing the foundation for patterns of 
voucher use and access to housing opportunities. One body of theory delineates 
how the spatial arrangements formed by public housing programs compound 
racial and economic inequalities (Squires & Kubrin 2006). This theory suggests 
that a combination of personal circumstances (e.g. affordability and 
neighborhood preferences) and conditions of the local housing market (e.g. 
housing supply and cost of available housing) determine the patterns of 
neighborhood choice for voucher recipients. In other words, inequitable access to 
affordable housing in white communities can be attributed to the combination of 
an individual household’s budget for renting/leasing a unit and the state of the 
local housing market. However, other groups argue that this theory disregards 
the significance of the roles of property managers and landlords in housing 
outcomes. The perspective of these authors focuses on the impact of power 
influences on the housing choice voucher as a symbol of social stratification  
(Turner & Ross 2005). Research explains that this theory centers on groups and 
positions of power that use their resources to influence low-income households 
from accessing residences in their neighborhoods (Turner & Ross 2005). 
Moreover, the authors of this research reveal that the approaches of these groups 
of power included not only racial discrimination but also local housing regulatory 
policies (such as land-use/zoning regulations and restrictive covenants) to 
restrict and shape pathways of minority access to these communities (Turner & 
Ross 2005). The differences in the two perspectives can be seen in how much 
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emphasis is placed on the roles of “market actors” (e.g. landlords, real estate 
agents, and property managers), specifically their utilization of income status and 
race as criteria to manage the access to certain communities. Despite the 
important findings observed from identifying the causes for the spatial patterns 
of housing choice voucher neighborhoods, understanding the interactions and 
approaches of landlords with other stakeholders (e.g. local Public Housing 
Authorities and voucher recipients) in the HCVP can provide an in-depth 
perspective on the significant impacts that the relationships and individual 
approaches of market actors have on household outcomes (Greenlee 2014). 
 
The Significance of the Roles of Landlords 
 Landlords play a critical part in the successful implementation of the 
HCVP, but there has been an existing lack of understanding about the ways in 
which landlords implement housing practices to influence the outcomes of the 
program. For instance, there is not a lot of standardized data to fully analyze the 
influence of rental house suppliers in rental housing markets (DiPasquale, 1999). 
There should be a greater focus in analyzing the influence of landlords and 
property managers with their methods and practices, as well as their effects on 
the living experiences of their voucher tenants. Greenlee conducted a study in 
which he interviewed landlords in Illinois and the varying perspectives of the 
HCVP. He concluded, “for many landlords, the first exposure to the program 
occurred upon acquiring a new rental investment property in which voucher-
subsidized tenants were already living” (Greenlee, 2014). Many landlords 
associate HCVP to be implemented in more urban neighborhoods while landlords 
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in rural and suburban communities said that they were not knowledgeable about 
information on the voucher program. When combined with a city’s plan that 
primarily involves the demolition and rehabilitation of fixed-unit public housing, 
such a plan creates a public narrative about who voucher households are and 
what their presence and mobility represent for a community (Greenlee 2011). 
Because of these misperceptions about voucher households, many landlords do 
not want voucher households to be situated in their neighborhoods, as they 
believe that voucher holders can decrease the property values. Furthermore, 
because of such stereotypes, new landlords reject participation in the voucher 
programs. The outcomes of the voucher program then follow a similar pattern.  
Though the freedom of choice for voucher holders to decide where to live 
is assumed in the provisions of the HCVP, researchers have shown in studies on 
the roles of landlords that they can influence the outcomes of the program for 
voucher households in different ways. Turner explains, “they clearly play an 
important role in determining whether problem behavior by individual voucher 
recipients becomes a serious problem for the neighborhoods in which the 
recipients live” (Turner 1999). Turner mentions the “problem behavior by 
individual voucher recipients” to refer to the tenant behavior of voucher holders 
who violate agreements made in their leases (Turner 1999). She notes there are 
some metropolitan cities that unintentionally allow landlords who accept 
vouchers to target families with a high probability of exhibiting disruptive 
behavior. Disruptive behavior comprised of complaints about the conditions of 
units. For example, Turner explains that landlords who fail to perform screenings 
and background checks for prospective tenants, enforce the lease terms, fix any 
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damages to properties, and evict problematic tenants may allow for voucher 
holders to undermine the neighborhood well-being (1999). In other words, 
landlords disregard their obligations in their relationship with voucher tenants so 
that they can take advantage of the subsidies without any circumstances. 
Moreover, existing literature suggests that landlords participate in the voucher 
program in order to increase their own rental income at the expense of the 
neighborhood’s well-being, potentially perpetuating the conditions of high 
poverty neighborhoods (Turner, 1999). These examples provide evidence that 
landlords have a large control over how the program affects neighborhood well-
being and tenant outcomes. Landlords who continue to exploit the voucher 
program without regard for the outcomes to the well-being of neighborhoods and 
voucher holders bring about discriminatory effects from such approaches in the 
program.  
 
Impact of Landlord Perceptions  
While some landlords consider voucher tenants to be steady sources of 
income, others still hang onto the stigma attached to voucher subsidies. 
Furthermore, since there is a large housing demand, landlords positively view 
voucher households in the perspective that they are catalysts to their business. 
Given that interviews conducted with landlords in Chicago were conducted after 
the “burst of the housing bubble in 2007,” landlords described irregularities in 
collecting rent from fair market-rate tenants (Greenlee 2014). This issue made 
renting to market-rate tenants unfavorable for most landlords; as a result, they 
viewed voucher households as a valuable means for generating a stable financial 
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return. Nevertheless, landlord perceptions of housing voucher tenants during the 
lease up process suggest that the implications of their income status still hold 
significance over the stability of subsidized rental payments. Without very much 
knowledge about the housing search process, voucher households become subject 
to different treatment from that of non-voucher (market-rate) tenants. Landlords 
go through their own screenings consisting of criminal background and credit 
checks since voucher holders are regarded distinctly from market-rate tenants. 
Due to a lack of information that landlords possess about the program, “many of 
the tools used to assess creditworthiness and background may work against the 
case of voucher-subsidized households because of the potential for mismatch 
between household financial background and their purchasing power” (Greenlee, 
2014). This missed opportunity hinders the voucher applicant from successfully 
taking the opportunity to rent housing under that landlord due to misperceptions 
and lack of knowledge. It is also important to note the effect in which low-income 
rental families fail to receive the full benefits of these vouchers. In the 2013 
American Housing Survey, “1 percent of poor renting households lived in rent-
controlled units, 15 percent lived in public housing, 17 percent received a 
government subsidy, mainly in the form of a rent-reducing voucher… and 67% 
received nothing” (Desmond Perkins, 2016). Further research must include the 
roles and attitudes of landlords in their approaches to the program in order to 
fully understand the incentives and disincentives for participants.  
 Several studies provide evidence that housing discrimination and 
segregation based on racial stereotypes are significant factors that prevent 
voucher holders from accessing safe, decent, affordable housing. Because race is a 
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socially constructed classification of biological differences entrenched into our 
institutions, there are less than more shared conceptions about ethnicity and 
cultural background. Literature on residential segregation and discrimination 
suggest that demand for housing tends to be the lowest in areas where voucher 
holders are most likely to find housing. Existing evidence reveals that people of 
color participating in the program, particularly African Americans, are most 
likely to be geographically concentrated to locate in higher-poverty and higher-
minority neighborhoods (Turner and Wilson 1998). Moreover, research on the 
persistence of racial segregation in housing markets indicates that the 
neighborhoods in which African American voucher holders choose to live have 
lower income status than those in which white voucher holders live (Logan, Alba, 
and Leung 1996). Middle-class neighborhoods comprised of people of color 
participating in the voucher program are geographically closer to poorer 
neighborhoods and neighborhoods with higher crime rates and include more 
participants with insecure economic and social circumstances than the 
neighborhoods of middle-class white voucher holders. Because many white 
voucher holders are unwilling to move into neighborhoods that they perceive as 
black or racially changing (Farley, Fielding, and Kryson 1997), areas that are the 
most accessible to people of color participating in the program have the lowest 
property values and are the most susceptible to increase in poverty levels. The 
continued practices of housing discrimination and segregation in landlord 
approaches to leasing up HCVP stakeholders are significant factors contributing 
to the lack accessibility to safe, decent, affordable housing for people of color 
participating in the program.   
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Landlord Interactions with Stakeholders in the Housing Choice Voucher 
Program 
 Existing literature on the relationships and interactions of landlords in the 
HCVP show that overt discrimination during the housing search only represents 
one of several ways in which landlords treat voucher households differently from 
market-rate tenants. More subtle forms of landlord approaches exist in filtering 
voucher households in and out of the local neighborhoods. Therefore, 
discrimination based on income includes more than just a bias against vouchers 
as a source of income (Greenlee 2014). The explanation for the concentrations of 
voucher households in high poverty neighborhoods can be understood from the 
variability in assessment approaches of landlords when determining tenant risk. 
This variability suggests that discrepancies in exposure and knowledge about 
voucher households and the HCVP exist among landlords. Greenlee says, “The 
volume of tenant applications seen by larger landlords often makes it easier for 
them to develop objective standards of risk to apply specifically to voucher-
assisted households” (Greenlee 2014). Even though the traditional screening 
process for fair market rate tenants is likely to bias against voucher households, 
not all landlords share the same screening process. And so, certain rental units 
and neighborhoods become housing choices of least resistance to leasing voucher 
holders while other areas consisting of landlords with little exposure to HCVP 
applications maintain more traditional or subjective standards for determining 
tenant risk. The standards and objectivity of assessment approaches vary in 
determining tenant risk as the knowledge and experience of landlords also vary.   
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 Some landlords described experiences in which they used the voucher 
subsidy as a way of controlling tenant demands and behavior. For example, in 
their strategy to create a barrier between tenant needs and landlord obligations, 
several landlords in Chicago allowed for tenants to get behind on their monthly 
rents (Greenlee 2014). Ignoring or failure to tend to tenant concerns about the 
rental unit would normally result in the voucher household moving out when the 
lease agreement ends. However, landlords who use the mentioned approach 
potentially cause the tenant to lose their voucher if the landlord chooses to 
inform the local Public Housing Authority about late payments. Landlords who 
accept voucher households create the potential for program abuse and benefit 
from renting to voucher households (Greenlee 2014). Essentially, they gain 
control over the dynamics of the tenant and landlord relationship to maintain a 
profit from the subsidies provided by the local Public Housing Authority on 
behalf of the voucher tenant.  
 In their interactions with the Chicago Housing Authority, landlords have 
often cited that HUD’s lengthy lease up process created disincentives for them to 
participate in the HCVP (Greenlee 2014). Because the lease up process includes 
ensuring that voucher households are renting units that meet housing quality 
standards, landlords face an additional challenge in potentially losing profit from 
this vacant unit while waiting for it to be approved. The process is bureaucratic in 
the sense that it is extremely important to make sure that landlords are providing 
quality housing but the lengthy approval process causes disincentives to 
landlords who receive a greater demand for their units from the private market. 
Moreover, state policies established to provide housing assistance also impede 
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this progress. While program participation from landlords is important to the 
success of the HCVP, the goals of the HCVP cannot be overlooked in favor of 
alleviating landlord disincentives.  
 Though most landlords suggested that their motivations for participating 
in the HCVP only extended to providing a basic housing good, others described a 
more holistic approach when renting to voucher tenants. For example, around 
two thirds of landlords interviewed in Chicago described having a more 
delineated approach while the remaining third described a method offering more 
flexibility (Greenlee 2014). Those who took delineated approaches included 
landlords who did not make efforts to develop relationships with tenants; rather, 
some set barriers in these relationships to take advantage of voucher subsidies, as 
mentioned previously in other studies. On the other hand, signs of offering 
flexibility to voucher tenants showed that some landlords found benefits to 
participating through ways other than financial returns. These landlords believed 
that they benefit from having a positive influence on the life circumstances of 
low-income households (Greenlee 2014). Examples of flexibility from landlords 
included developing flexible payment plans for rent, extending financial 
counseling, and paying the security deposits for voucher households. While the 
motivations of these landlords are grounded in a demonstrated social mission or 
desire to put their rental unit forward as a way of helping households that they 
perceived to be in need of assistance, further motivations exist for incorporating 
their social mission into participation in the program. Greenlee states, “For some, 
program participation was prompted by their own life histories, growing out of 
poverty and past situations in which they relied upon government assistance” 
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(Greenlee 2014). In addition, landlords taking a more holistic approach 
expressed that they recognized and were aware of the significance of their roles 
and management strategies as landlords (Greenlee 2014). Even though some 
landlords carry social missions and more knowledge about the HCVP into their 
participation, it is still unclear whether using such strategies are anything more 
than strategies for protecting a valuable and reliable source of financial returns.     
 
 
Methodology 
 A qualitative methods approach was used to answer my research 
questions. In contextualizing Pasadena’s housing needs and analyzing 
discriminatory housing practices I reviewed literature covering fair housing, the 
Housing Choice Voucher Program, and neighborhood effects of the program. I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with landlords and public housing staff 
members in Pasadena. These interviews were semi-structured to make sure that 
participants talked about the same themes and concepts but the questions are left 
open-ended so that they have the flexibility to share their personal experiences 
and anecdotes. I held interviews with each participant in a one-on-one setting 
either in person or through the phone. The interview questions focused on the 
roles and attitudes of landlords and public housing authority staff members in 
their relationships and voucher contracts with tenants.  I recorded the interviews 
through tape recordings that I subsequently transcribed once the primary data 
had been collected. In order to ensure the confidentiality of participant identity, I 
plan to delete the recordings of interviews once all transcriptions are finished. 
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Moreover, I did not state the names or any descriptions of participants that could 
potentially reveal their identity.  
I recruited several landlords for the study by reaching out to the City of 
Pasadena Housing Department (CoPHD) and Union Station Homeless Shelter, a 
local homeless services center, for a list of landlords who currently are or have 
participated in the voucher program. Though the discretion of the CoPHD did not 
allow for such a list to be disclosed, I was able to utilize its website to search for 
properties under the HCVP within a 15 mile radius of the housing authority. This 
strategy resulted in interviews with two landlords. In addition, the CoPHD was 
unwilling to allow HCVP staff to answer any questions about their experiences 
and perspectives on the program’s stakeholders. Utilizing a different strategy to 
recruit interviewees, I contacted housing advocacy groups in the City of Pasadena 
and Los Angeles County. In addition, I attended a public monthly meeting for the 
city’s Continuum of Care program at the CoPHD. Attending this meeting allowed 
me to connect with any other advocates I could interview. This approach led me 
to a list of housing advocates and their organizations. I interviewed six housing 
advocates. Though housing advocates do not directly participate in the program 
as other stakeholders do, some have had experiences as former/current landlords 
or voucher recipients. Working directly with voucher recipients, housing 
advocates provide personal experiences from working with landlords and 
analysis of voucher household outcomes. As a result, these perspectives have 
allowed for a case –by-case view of the problems that occur in housing searches, 
negotiations of HAP contracts, and tenant-landlord relationships.  
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To evaluate the roles and housing practices of landlords in the HCVP in 
Pasadena and Los Angeles County, I interviewed property managers of buildings 
for project-based units and for tenant-based vouchers and housing advocates in 
the nonprofit sector. The interviews and housing practices discussed were 
directed towards the perceived obligations of landlords in a voucher household’s 
housing search and lease negotiations. While the perspectives of public housing 
officials would be significant for this type of research, I was informed that HCVP 
staff members in Pasadena are restricted from participating in my study at this 
time.  
Participants of the study were asked about their general perception on the 
negatives and positives of the program, the transparency of stakeholder 
relationships, behaviors of landlords, and tenant selection. Additionally, 
participants were asked about their personal experiences with landlords and 
housing authority staff in regards to the HCVP. In order to keep the identities of 
participants anonymous throughout the data of this study, I refer to participants 
in my interview data as either “housing advocate” or “landlord”. I found several 
recurring themes in each interview: voucher household selection, the roles of 
HCVP stakeholders, responses to tenant behavior, and expectations for the future 
of the HCVP. 
 
Research Questions 
The Housing Choice Voucher program was designed to help deconcentrate 
poverty in the U.S. This research is an evaluation of the interactions and roles of 
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landlords and public housing officials in the Housing Choice Voucher program in 
Pasadena, CA. In particular I attempt to answer the following questions:  
o What kinds of interactions do landlords in Pasadena have in their 
relationships with voucher holders as opposed to those with 
market-rate tenants? 
o How do administrative burdens in the program affect stakeholder 
interactions?  
o How do landlords respond to tenant behavior and who takes 
responsibility for tenant issues? 
o What motivations do landlords have for participating in the HCVP? 
 
 
Case Study 
Housing Choice Voucher Program in Los Angeles, CA and other cities 
In an examination of the public housing programs throughout the U.S., 
housing and economic experts have concluded that public housing programs in 
places like Chicago and Detroit have developed into policies and housing 
practices contributing to segregation and discrimination. For example, Richard 
Rothstein of the Economic Policy Institute notes that 99% of public housing 
residents in Detroit are African American according to HUD’s data within the 
Detroit Housing Commission. Lawrence Vale of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology attributes this housing discrimination to Americans “racializing the 
conflation of where people live with who they are” (Vale 2015). In other words, 
many people have shifted their perceptions from “people who need public 
housing the most” to “people who are wrecking our neighborhood.” However, the 
distinction between who needs public housing and what is causing the rise in 
neighborhood crime and violence does not stem from the people who are living in 
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these areas but from the high levels of poverty and the lack of maintenance in 
buildings. As households that receive government assistance live on average 
incomes of less than $13,000 per year, local housing authorities often do not have 
sufficient funds to support the maintenance of buildings after rent payments and 
security deposits are used for upkeep (Vale 2015).  
Despite the fact that the design of the HCVP is intended for a broader 
population of households in need of housing assistance, the housing assistance 
program has also reduced national homelessness for targeted populations. 
Because the primary target for the HCVP is a low-income household earning 30% 
or less of the Area’s Median Income (AMI), HUD administers the program in 
partnership with other funding streams to reduce homelessness for a more 
targeted population. Since 2010, the number of homeless veteran in the U.S. fell 
by 36%; and, in 2015, 56,033 homeless veterans were housed as a result of 
investments in targeted vouchers by HUD and the Veteran Supportive Housing 
Program (CBPP 2016). Additionally, homelessness among veterans in the U.S. 
fell as the number of vouchers in use for homeless veterans increased (CBPP 
2016). These results show how a less broad and more targeted or specific 
approach to housing specific homeless populations can be more effective in 
housing those in need of housing assistance.   
As for low-income populations in the U.S., over 2 million low-income 
households used Housing Choice Vouchers to afford decent, privately owned 
housing in 2015 (CBPP 2016). On the other hand, 77% of very low-income 
households were not assisted by the HCVP and yet they pay too much for rent 
such that 68% of these households pay more than half their income to pay for 
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housing (CBPP 2016). Furthermore, 546,708 people in the U.S. in 2015 have 
been repeatedly homeless or homeless for a long period of time. These statistics 
show how the limited number of vouchers has affected low-income and very low-
income households in the U.S. Additionally, waiting lists to apply for the HCVP 
can take a long time before they are reopened. HUD stated in a report that Los 
Angeles has one of the longest waiting periods for Housing Choice Vouchers at an 
average of 10 years (HUD 2001). Maintaining the housing that low-income 
households acquire through the voucher remains to be a large issue. In Los 
Angeles County, about 13,000 people on some kind of housing assistance fall into 
homelessness every month (Holland 2015). The number of people who 
experience chronic homelessness keeps growing regardless of the number of 
people who were housed in recent years (Holland 2015). This growth in 
continuous homelessness indicates that housing cannot serve as a solution until 
preventative approaches are taken to limit the ways in which people become 
homeless. Such preventative approaches must account for the needs of voucher 
tenants and the obligations of landlords. 
Housing Choice vouchers have created a stigma around the households 
who do not have a strong enough income to afford high market rents because the 
high poverty neighborhoods they move into often involve violence, drug use, and 
chronic homelessness. However, the success of public housing programs relies on 
more than just the people who live in these projects. The news media industry 
has exhibited a perceived notoriety of public housing and the people it assists 
(Vale 2015).  Vale conducted a study on the news media industry’s perception of 
public housing to be “notorious” through a search for articles from a range of 
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newspapers mentioning the words “public housing” within fifty words of the 
word “notorious” (Vale 2015). In several well-known daily newspapers, the 
frequency of these occurrences sharply increased in the 1990s and again in the 
2000s. These findings show that the news media industry conveys a skewed 
perspective of public housing assistance such that those who apply are assumed 
to have morally failed to fulfill the plan of attaining and maintaining a home 
because they live in neighborhoods with high levels of poverty. The public also 
adopts this perspective and treats low-income families under public housing 
assistance similarly. HUD data further provides evidence for the negative impact 
that Housing Choice vouchers have had on the type of neighborhoods for which 
voucher holders are bound. Moreover, the findings of a study by public policy 
researcher Pope included in Yaquian-Illescas’ report on tenant mobility in Los 
Angeles show that even after controlling for income status, families of color are 
still less likely than white families to move to predominantly white 
neighborhoods and are more likely to move to colored or racially mixed 
neighborhoods (1995). The Housing Choice voucher program has not only 
increased the stigma on voucher households but also increased the cases of 
existing segregation.  
Because of the stigma attached to Housing Choice vouchers, landlords are 
more likely to turn people of color away. A study in Chicago conducted by the 
Lawyer’s Committee for Better Housing found that landlords would use the 
restrictions under the HCVP as an excuse for rejecting voucher holders of color 
(2002). The study indicated that landlords often don’t want voucher holders in 
their housing units because voucher holders are often associated with African 
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American and Latino individuals and families (LCBH 2002). In a similar study 
done in Baltimore, Chris Swope indicates that certain differences in voucher 
values are accepted or rejected by landlords. Ed Rutkowski, a leader of a 
community development corporation that revitalizes neighborhoods on the east 
side of Baltimore, calls the HCVP “a catalyst in neighborhood deterioration and 
ghetto expansion.” Because landlords in low poverty neighborhoods will often 
reject vouchers due to the unfair implications that persist around this form of 
payment, low-income households become concentrated in high poverty 
neighborhoods, leading to neglected properties, persistent crime, and a 
consistent influx of homelessness. 
Several states throughout the U.S. have passed laws to ban discrimination 
against sources of income. Since 2015, these states include Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and 
Vermont, along with the District of Columbia (Brunet 2016). Though only a small 
number of states have passed such policies, cities and counties across the nation 
have proposed or passed similar policies to forbid landlords to discriminate 
against renters for their source of income. Some of these cities include Los 
Angeles, Seattle, New York City, Philadelphia, and Miami-Dade County (Brunet 
2016). Furthermore, California could join the list of states that passed these 
policies. CA Senator Mark Leno in February 2016 proposed a bill called Senate 
Bill 1053; the main provisions of the bill prohibit landlords “to discriminate 
against prospective tenants based on their income; instigate written or oral 
inquiry on a tenant concerning their source of income; and publish a notice, 
statement or advertisement indicating a preference, limitation, or discrimination 
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based on income” (Brunet 2016). While landlords would still have the ability to 
turn away voucher households under the proposed law, the only lawful reason for 
landlords to deny them housing is their criminal background, credit, and rental 
history. Therefore, states that pass similar policies can “extend the protections of 
the Fair Housing Act to include other characteristics, such as marital status, 
sexual orientation and source of income used to rent” (CFED 2015). Despite the 
fact that the Fair Housing Act does not establish a contextual claim for 
discrimination based on source of income under its provisions, passing laws that 
extend other characteristics specific to the needs of voucher households protect 
the goals of the HCVP to provide affordable, decent and safe housing and to 
facilitate household residential location choice. With more counties and states 
looking into such policies, it becomes increasingly important to ensure that 
voucher holders have easier paths to finding their next home. On the other hand, 
discrimination in more subtle forms exists in the interactions between 
stakeholders of the HCVP. In order to fully accomplish these goals in the future, 
alleviating burdens to the path to finding affordable housing for voucher 
households must also account for more subtle forms of discrimination. 
In the efforts of the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) 
to ban discrimination against housing choice voucher recipients, housing officials 
have described several incentives for property owners to accept housing choice 
vouchers. These incentives include offering a “guaranteed damage mitigation 
fund” and paying security deposits and holding fees (Barragan 2016). The 
purpose of the mitigation fund is to pay for maintenance of units after the tenant 
moves out; the holding fees and security deposits ensure that landlords will 
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dedicate these vacant units to renting to voucher families. Such incentives can 
draw landlords to participate in the HCVP but some explained that the main 
issue remained. The revenue from renting to voucher holders is not sufficient for 
positive returns. One Los Angeles landlord explained, “The maximum allowance 
for a Section 8 voucher is $1,600, so, if a two bedroom apartment rents for 
$2,100 based on the area’s average, the landlord wouldn’t have much of an 
incentive to accept a $1600 voucher, even with the perks from the county” 
(Daniel 2016). As the maximum allowance for vouchers are dependent on the fair 
market rent of the entire county, the fair market rent for Los Angeles County 
doesn’t account for the fluctuations of rent in different neighborhoods. “So 
vouchers might pay too much in one neighborhood, and too little in others,” said 
Ehren Dohler from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Daniel 2016). In 
addition to bureaucratic procedures involved in leasing up voucher tenants, 
broad coverage of the fair market rent over the unique neighborhoods in Los 
Angeles County further exhibits the bureaucratic nature of housing assistance 
policies. As a result, landlords have to make the choice between charity and 
income.  
 
Homelessness and Low-Income Housing in Pasadena, CA 
 As the availability of affordable rental housing in Los Angeles County is 
quite scarce, about half of the households in Pasadena, CA who rent are 
overburdened such that they pay more than 30% of their gross income (U.S. 
Census 2010). Households making less than a monthly median income of $4,583 
are considered overburdened in Pasadena when renting at or above the monthly 
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median rent of $1,375 (U.S. Census 2010). In addition, Pasadena was reported by 
Apartmentlist.com to have the biggest year-over-year rent increase in the Los 
Angeles metro area. The inability to pay rent has been cited as the leading cause 
of homelessness. Low-income families do not have a lot of options in such a tight 
housing market and some resort to living in unsheltered areas because fair 
market rents in the area are too high. Mike Nemeth, spokesperson for the 
California Apartment Association, explains, “The number of apartments being 
built isn’t keeping pace with the number of jobs that are being created. That 
creates a supply-and-demand ratio that doesn’t line up” (Smith 2015). On the 
other hand, homeless service centers in Pasadena have been making strong 
efforts to facilitate and maintain housing for low-income families and homeless 
populations. Moreover, the 2016 Pasadena Homeless Count provides data 
showing that between 2015 and 2016 there was a 20% decrease in unsheltered 
homelessness. This means that the number of homeless that were unsheltered 
dropped from 442 in 2015 to 352 in 2016. To put these numbers in perspective, 
the 2016 Homeless Count in Los Angeles County reported that the number of 
homeless that were unsheltered in 2015 was 31,025 and in 2016 was 34,701 
(LAHSA, 2016). These results show that Pasadena has contributed to rather than 
impeded efforts to reduce unsheltered homelessness in Los Angeles County. 
These reductions in Pasadena can be attributed to the implementation of new 
approaches in 2011 and the continued active search for partnerships with 
landlords and property owners willing to rent to formerly homeless and low-
income families. However, the implications of these results still remain unclear, 
as it is possible that formerly homeless populations in Pasadena that could not 
Lua 49 
maintain their housing due to their disabling condition, race, or income 
contributed towards the increase in the unsheltered homeless population in Los 
Angeles County.  
 Though the total number of homeless unsheltered has recently decreased, 
the main problem in Pasadena’s efforts to reduce homelessness lies in those who 
experience chronic homelessness. In Pasadena, 530 people were considered to be 
homeless in 2016 but the number of people who have greater needs and are 
chronically homeless made up the majority of total homelessness. The chronically 
homeless population makes up 42% of the total homeless population and the 
2016 Pasadena Homeless Count reported 225 people to be chronically homeless. 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development defines “chronic 
homelessness” as “either (1) an unaccompanied homeless individual with a 
disabling condition who has been continuously homeless for a year or more, OR 
(2) an unaccompanied individual with a disabling condition who has had at least 
four episodes of homelessness in the past three years” (2007). Disabling 
conditions include a diagnosable substance abuse disorder, a serious mental 
illness, a developmental disability, or a chronic physical illness or disability 
(HUD 12). The needs of the chronically homeless population are greater since 
they require further assistance to accommodate for their disabling condition. In 
the efforts of the City of Pasadena Housing Department (CoPHD) to “End 
Chronic Homeless by 2017,” the chronically homeless population has only 
increased since 2013 in Pasadena. This increase indicates that current strategies 
to build additional housing have not addressed the pathways or causes to 
experiencing homelessness. In addition to the lack of success in solving this 
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problem, discrimination based on certain characteristics impacting tenant 
outcomes remains as a significant problem for maintaining affordable housing 
for low-income families and formerly homeless populations.  
 Furthermore, the CoPHD carries its own administrative burdens in 
facilitating affordable housing and household residential location choice. One 
such burden includes the limited resources that the CoPHD has to distribute 
vouchers to all residents. The last time the CoPHD opened its waiting list for 
Housing Choice Vouchers was on October 15, 2014 but was shortly closed on 
November 1, 2014. Therefore, low-income households and formerly homeless 
populations will have to find their own individuals approaches to finding a place 
to live or revert to their previous housing. In addition to the shortage in available 
vouchers, administrative changes on the federal level may pose challenges to 
achieving the goals of the HCVP. With Ben Carson as the new Secretary of HUD, 
housing officials across the nation are only anticipating billions in budget cuts to 
public housing assistance funds (Capps 2017). While Carson has yet to explicitly 
state his plans for the future of HUD and housing assistance programs, “the 
Trump administration has considered more than $6 billion in cuts at the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, according to preliminary 
budget documents obtained by The Washington Post” (DelReal 2017). Housing 
advocates add that their best guess for the estimated total cuts to the Housing 
Choice Voucher Program is over $1 billion (Capps 2017). Local Public Housing 
Authorities across the nation are already cutting their budgets in preparation for 
these federal cuts. Because the federal government reimburses agencies for the 
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number of vouchers used, cities that have every family using their vouchers will 
receive larger budgets cuts since these reimbursements result in further 
administrative costs (Capps 2017). Moreover, agencies will not have enough 
funds to administer voucher assistance to all low-income families if they 
maximize the number of vouchers used. All in all, regardless of the preparatory 
budget cuts made by local Public Housing Authorities, the number of families 
that won’t receive housing assistance will continue to increase. The budget 
proposal also has implications for local community development in Pasadena, 
CA. As the CoPHD receives $1.7 million from HUD to fund the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, $600,000 from these funds are 
dedicated to the development of affordable units as well as homeless and non-
homeless programs and services for residents (e.g. Boys & Girls club, Rose Bowl 
Aquatic Center, Mother’s Club, etc.). The rest of the CDBG funds are dedicated 
towards preventing poverty and urban decline in local neighborhoods. The 
current HUD budget is set to dedicate $3 billion to CDBG programs throughout 
the U.S. this fiscal year; however, the proposed budget would cut these funds 
entirely (DelReal 2017). The implications of the proposed budget cuts do not 
reflect positive signs for the availability of housing vouchers to low-income 
families and homeless populations in need of housing assistance. Additionally, it 
is likely that individuals and families who experience chronic homelessness will 
find it harder to achieve their needs and maintain housing.  
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Findings 
  Given the perspective of housing advocates in their personal experiences 
in working with landlords, voucher recipients, and housing officials, how do 
stakeholder interactions influence voucher households directly? There are four 
ways in which I identified how stakeholder interactions influence household 
outcomes: voucher household selection, roles of HCVP stakeholders, responses to 
tenant behavior, and expectations for the future of the HCVP.  
 
Voucher Household Selection 
 Housing advocates expressed the extent to which landlords conduct their 
background checks for voucher households. In the process of selecting a voucher 
recipient, landlords were cited by housing advocates as important partners in 
determining the outcomes of affordable rental units. Public Housing Authorities 
utilize a simple background check process to determine if low-income households 
are deemed eligible for the HCVP but landlords can select whomever they like for 
their property. Because this process gives landlords a position of power, they 
have the freedom to form criteria for tenants. Moreover, housing advocates said 
that landlords would prefer tenants with low risk. One housing advocate 
explained that landlords more often than not are strict in searching for a tenant: 
In the areas that market rate developers invest landlords will say that 
certain credit scores aren’t high enough and reject them or if they have a 
single eviction they will be out, references from landlords who give 
horrible reviews and will also be out, late rents will be out. 
 
Furthermore, some housing advocates explained that landlords have a 
number of prejudices and biases in the screening process for voucher tenants 
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because it is important for them to determine the risk of the household. 
Determining this risk serves as a metric for potential extra costs for landlords 
when the unit is in need of maintenance after voucher households move out. One 
landlord explained examples of criteria for screening voucher recipients:  
At the end of the day, it depends on the type of the building but the 
some of the people we do fall under three categories: arsonists, we 
cant bring in arsonists mainly because our insurance companies 
wont allow us; people who have actually produced meth labs 
because again its endangering the building, yourselves, and 
everyone, and the end of the day its tied to insurance and liability; 
and people involved in sexual predation or sexual infractions 
because often times these are family households and family living. 
So these are the types of people we can reject. 
 
 
Since landlords possess a position of power in the screening process, many 
voucher holders do not have success finding available rental units in comparison 
to market rate tenants. Landlords especially become more likely to rent to market 
rate tenants financial returns are favorable. Though vacancy rates and housing 
supply are low, landlords still keep a selective process for leasing to voucher 
households due to not only prejudice but also competition from the high demand 
for affordable housing. One housing advocate described the difficulty for voucher 
households to access available rental units due to the demands of the housing 
market: 
I think in probably a few years back when vacancy rates were low it 
was more of an issue [of filling vacant units] but landlords have a 
chance to look at a number of applicants and basically select the 
best candidate. 
 
Landlords have bias in their screening process because they want a certain 
type of tenant living on their property. While related studies have described 
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source of income bias to contribute to housing outcomes, administration of the 
program in some cities show that this is not the case across the board. Therefore, 
the type of bias depends on the knowledge and exposure of landlords to voucher 
households. This exposure is represented by the number of voucher households 
that remain in neighborhoods of high poverty, as there are certain neighborhoods 
with less resistance to voucher households. Those who have little to no 
experience with voucher households are likely to accept the stigma surrounding 
housing choice vouchers as a filter for tenants with potential risk. One landlord 
described their views on ensuring the safety of their property: 
I think it's their responsibility to keep an eye on the people that 
they're bringing in and do a check on them and do a walkthrough to 
make sure they're not hoarding and they aren't thugs. 
 
As the voucher program has often been stigmatized as a program 
for poor families with histories of bad credit and evictions, landlords 
develop these stereotypes into their screening processes. Existing 
literature show landlords often avoid voucher recipients because it’s easier 
to not have to take on the likelihood of bringing potential risk and 
damages to the property. Therefore, this leads to landlord to compare 
voucher tenants in the same way that they do for market rate tenants. 
Housing advocates explained that solving this issue is not as easy as it may 
seem. Because there are so many extra considerations that landlords must 
make for the potential risk that voucher households may carry with them, 
landlords view market rate tenants to be more favorable in terms of their 
expectations. One housing advocate described his view on the impact of 
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adding regulations to prohibit these expectations from affecting the 
housing outcomes for tenants searching for available rental units:  
One of the problems landlords have with accepting vouchers to 
begin with is they don’t want to jump through all of those hoops. So 
to add for some landlords what would be additional requirements of 
processes, I don’t think it would be helpful. I think it would increase 
the bloat on a system that is already bloated basically. 
 
The exposure of landlords to the program is important to the perspectives 
they hold in selecting a tenant. Because the methods that landlords use for 
measuring credit history and criminal background don’t change for voucher 
tenants, they are essentially held to the same standards that they hold for a 
market rate tenant. The high number of people who need housing also 
contributes to the perspective that landlords don’t have to take voucher tenants 
when there are tenants who are expected to bring less potential risk. The 
differences in financial background and criminal background for market rate and 
voucher recipients are significant to how landlords choose who they want on their 
properties. While this comparison highlights the stereotypes on voucher 
households, it does not provide a full picture of tenants. Landlords hold a 
perspective that whether the financial returns to their property are at risk 
determines the type of tenant a voucher holder could be. However, landlords 
often overlook the factors contributing to the differences in market rate and 
voucher tenant backgrounds. Voucher households represent rent overburdened 
low-income families and formerly homeless populations that hold disabilities or 
conditions that make it harder for them to maintain permanent housing. 
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Roles of HCVP Stakeholders 
Housing advocates described the bureaucracy that goes into 
accepting a voucher household into a rental unit. Because it is the 
responsibility of housing authorities to ensure that voucher households are 
placed in safe and decent housing, housing advocates explained how much 
work goes into transferring voucher households to new units. On the other 
hand, landlords perceive the time that goes into verifying low-income 
households for vouchers as a waiting period before they receive a stable 
financial return. One housing advocate described his views on the housing 
authority’s role in the bureaucracy that goes into placing voucher tenants 
in rental units:  
On the housing authority side, it’s kind of what you’d expect from a 
federal program, it’s a lot of paperwork a lot of redundant 
questions, a lot of checking and double checking. There’s a lot that’s 
going on in the housing authority side, and then every 30 days you 
typically have to have new eligibility paperwork so if the process 
goes beyond for days, before you issue your voucher, you have to get 
new income verification, you may have to sign new authorization… 
so it’s heavy on the housing authority side and it varies from 
landlord to landlord. 
 
Despite that local Public Housing Authorities take on the perspective that 
housing is a social good in their goals for the program, the interactions that they 
have with landlords exhibit relationships that extend only as far as verifying the 
compliance of landlords. Housing advocates expressed that Public Housing 
Authority officials are not as interested in their relationships with stakeholders as 
they are. Because housing advocates serve to provide housing and attach services 
to maintain housing, they try to convince landlords to take voucher tenants. 
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However, housing officials take a different approach. They take a perspective of 
following guidelines but do not find importance in creating relationships to 
increase voucher program outreach. In this sense, the perspectives of housing 
officials hold more significance in verifying the quality of housing to be provided 
to voucher tenants. One housing advocate described his views on the kinds of 
relationships that form between landlords and local public housing authorities: 
They have a checklist and just go down their list. We make sure 
through our property management that we match checkboxes. 
They’re bureaucrats and they’re just doing their job. Most 
inspectors are doing their job. They are equipped to looking at one 
thing. [Inspect] The physical environment and that’s it. They don’t 
look deeper into what the situation is. Lets say they go into the unit 
and someone’s balcony is full of storage. They say you get docked 
for it or something. But they dont really care finding out the 
background story why its there or certain things. 
Furthermore, housing advocates stated that the layers of requirements 
that go in to the inspection process reflect some of the issues that landlords want 
to avoid. Because renting to a market rate tenant would not include many of these 
inspections and paperwork, selecting between market rate versus voucher 
tenants becomes an easy choice. Housing advocates explained the impact of the 
bureaucracy that goes into the inspection process for landlords: 
There's the inspection process, working with the local housing 
authority around the requirements and paperwork process in terms 
of signing up for the appropriate tax program and there's 
these extra steps and requirements that are put on the landlord 
where they don't necessarily have to deal with these things for the 
private renter. The housing authority tends to argue that ultimately 
they're guaranteeing the rents of voucher recipients and low 
vacancy rates. 
On the other hand, one housing advocate described their personal 
experience in holding a positive relationship with inspectors and landlords. Even 
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though housing officials have shown they extend their relationship with landlords 
in terms of compliance, one housing advocated explained the awareness of the 
landlord to concerns voiced by inspectors. The housing advocate said that this 
landlord had intentions of evicting his voucher tenant but the housing advocacy 
organization assisting the tenant made the relationship more transparent for the 
landlord. While the landlord did not hold a perspective for offering consideration 
to the contributing factors to tenant behavior, housing advocates have provided 
the outreach and significance in perspectives for landlords. The housing advocate 
explained the impact of this relationship with landlords and inspectors for tenant 
outcomes: 
We have all built a relationship together in which the inspector 
knows the landlord really well. He knows what's wrong and tries to 
respond to it as quickly as possible. The inspector knows his 
response level so he will do what needs to be done. The inspector 
just tells him what needs to be done on the spot and then come back 
in two weeks and expects it to be done. It's quite lax and less 
stressful and a good relationship where the paperwork and such are 
all bypassed making it easier for everyone. Some landlords are on it. 
These findings exhibit the interactions between housing officials and 
landlords in their roles to provide and maintain housing for voucher recipients. 
Housing advocates have described experiences in which landlords have felt there 
were no incentives to participating in the program. Other advocates have shared 
similar experiences in which some housing officials were examining only the 
voucher household’s compliance to the program without any regard for the 
causes of for these issues. On the other hand, one housing advocate recalled an 
experience when a tenant was at risk of receiving an eviction if the tenant did not 
achieve the landlord’s terms in the lease agreement. Once housing advocacy 
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groups connected their case managers with this voucher household, the support 
and voucher knowledge they provided to the landlord allowed for a relationship 
to form. This relationship created a transparency for all stakeholders to interact 
in way that offered more sympathetic perspectives and appreciation. As a result, 
exposure to the program has shown to be an important factor in how landlords 
perceive their role to provide housing to voucher recipients. While landlords with 
less exposure are likely to utilize criteria for market rate tenants in their 
treatment of voucher households, it seems that more flexibility and transparency 
is offered from those receiving support from housing advocates. In addition, it is 
clear that housing advocates have an affect on the relationship between housing 
officials and landlords in some way. Further research on this relationship could 
be important to understanding how different forms of involvement or support 
from housing advocacy can promote permanent housing for voucher recipients.  
 
Response to Tenant Behavior 
Though behavior from voucher tenants are often based on bias around 
their financial and physical circumstances, housing advocates have explained the 
significance of outreach to landlords. As exposure to the program holds an 
impact on the perspectives of landlords, housing advocacy organizations take on 
efforts to ensure that these perspectives include the personal circumstances of 
voucher households. Providing this information not only helps landlords to keep 
a certain expectation for voucher households but also maintains these 
expectations from one voucher tenant to the next. One housing advocate explains 
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his thoughts on the contrasting approaches that landlords hold in their responses 
to tenant behavior: 
Most [do] not [respond] in a positive way. We have a lot of 
landlords who are very willing to work with people but they aren’t 
the majority. The population that we work with we have a family 
that's been moving around in the last 5 years and so we will explain 
this to the landlord who's been working with us for the last 2 years 
to make sure they learn to respect property and hope they take all 
the things that we help them with and continue practicing paying 
rent on time, make sure kids don't destroy property, shutting down 
the parties. You have to be a good neighbor if you want to be 
housed. 
 
As the ways that landlords respond to tenant behaviors vary across the 
board, housing advocates explained that dealing with late payments is one 
example of this variance. Responding to such behaviors can allow for landlords to 
take advantage of voucher subsidies. In this sense, housing advocates explained 
that discrimination for voucher tenants exists in subtle ways. Some landlords 
select voucher tenants who can offer more money to offset the Area Median 
Income (AMI) limitations on vouchers in Los Angeles County. One housing 
advocate recounted an example of a late rent payment negotiation between the 
voucher recipient and landlord:  
The tenant has a $1k voucher, the landlord wants $1100 for the 
unit, the house authority says we’ll only pay $1050...  and the 
landlord says to the tenant pay me the extra $50 on the side… and 
that’s our deal. That’s something that occurs here and there. I’ve 
seen it happen. 
 
 Some housing advocates expressed that neither housing officials nor 
landlords should hold responsibility for tenant behaviors. Even though they have 
personal circumstances that led them to their present life, one housing advocate 
voiced that voucher tenants should be aware of the lease agreements they signed 
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and make efforts to avoid any violations. If housing officials and landlords are 
performing their roles in the program, housing advocates stated tenants should 
also feel accountable. Just as market rate tenants are held accountable for 
damages and potential risk to property, housing advocates stated that voucher 
tenants should not be treated differently in this regard:  
 
I don’t think it’s ever the landlord’s responsibility since he’s done 
what he has to do in renting out to the tenant. And housing 
authority I don’t see how it’s their responsibility either because they 
are already taking care of financial parts and those who can’t pay 
their part. So I would say that it’s the tenant’s responsibility to 
behave. 
  
 On the other hand, other housing advocates expressed that the 
responsibility for managing tenant behavior and relationships is dependent on 
the landlord’s perspective for the impact of vacating their rental unit. Landlords 
who are focused on receiving stable financial returns from voucher subsidies 
tended to try to avoid evictions. In a sense, they offered flexibility to voucher 
recipients in order to avoid losing the stability that monthly voucher subsidies 
bring into their revenue. Since vacating a unit would mean that landlords had to 
go through the strenuous process again for selecting a tenant and losing a stable 
source of revenue, housing advocates expressed that some landlords are willing 
to work with voucher tenants. Housing advocates who worked with landlords 
explained the cost implications for evicting voucher tenants:  
In the grand scheme of things it is more cost effective to keep the 
unit leased instead of going through the eviction process and so 
forth. They will sometimes offer leniency with late payments and 
withhold the late fee because they want to keep things cordial and 
work with folks. But other ones they are by the book like if you don’t 
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pay in three days you’re getting a notice and late fee tacked on it. It 
really just depends on the property management. 
 
 While some landlords are looking to maintain their financial 
stability from responding to tenant behaviors, housing advocates 
explained that others held the tenant responsible for following lease 
agreements. The personal circumstances of voucher tenants may require 
extra considerations and services to be attached. However, housing 
advocates explained that because the local Public Housing Authority and 
landlords are fulfilling their obligations to administering the program, 
voucher tenants are held to the same expectations. In addition, the 
intentions of landlords to maintain stable revenue help in sustaining and 
expanding permanent housing for voucher holders. Though there are 
different views on who is responsible for responding to tenant behavior, 
the bottom line for landlords is that they want to retain the financial 
benefits of renting to voucher households and will use different means for 
maintaining these benefits. 
 
Expectations for the future of the HCVP  
 As housing advocates expressed their awareness about the changes 
to the presidential budget and HUD administration, they did not have 
optimistic views about the challenges the program will face. Significant 
budget cuts to the program will have dire consequences on local 
community development projects and the supply of affordable housing 
and services attached to housing assistance.  
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Despite these concerns, one housing advocate expressed that he is 
hopeful for finding other ways to meet these challenges. This advocate 
stated that it will be further under resourced but housing officials must get 
more involved in order to mitigate the consequences of such significant 
changes. One housing advocate explained his thoughts on the major 
changes to HUD and how the HCVP could improve in spite of these 
changes: 
Unfortunately with the given federal and HUD leadership changes 
going on in DC. We are at a time where we are really concerned. 
This program could get cut further. It’s a long waiting list for the 
vouchers. These vouchers serve as a way to provide rental subsidy 
for low-income families. There are definitely challenges with the 
program aside from it being under resourced. More education and 
outreach needs to happen on the landlord side. I think there has 
been a lot of efforts on the county level but I think that there needs 
to be more outreach because there are stigmas associated with 
section 8. 
 
Furthermore, one landlord shared similar views about the future of the voucher 
program:  
The number of vouchers is limited and my guess is that under this 
new administration, it will be even more limited. So they probably 
will continue with the people who are already receiving them but 
they probably will start issuing less. 
 
Some housing advocates accounted for the current housing supply and 
how it will impact voucher households in the future. As the current housing 
market reflects the shortage in housing and high demand, budget cuts at the 
federal level could perpetuate some of the bureaucratic issues that already exist in 
the program. Observations made by housing advocates include the challenges 
that voucher tenants to maintain their housing. One housing advocate described 
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the supply of housing market vouchers available and the observations of the 
impact of this shortage: 
Since the economy has done a rebound and the housing market has 
healed a little bit, there’s such a shortage of housing and there’s 
such a shortage of acceptable affordable housing that about three 
years ago, we started seeing people lose their vouchers because they 
went the entire 6 months unable to find property… and we have 
seen that before. 
The degree to which administrative burdens will further have an impact on 
housing outcomes in the HCVP will be determined by the final budget cuts for 
HUD. While it is expected that over $1 million will be cut in Pasadena’s budget 
for affordable housing and homeless services, some advocates stated that these 
cuts cannot be reflected as a sign for allowing this emerging problem to 
perpetuate current issues in the future. While outreach and rental housing 
meetings are some approaches that the CoPHD already use, the limited resources 
and underfunded projects prevent further efforts to expand the acceptance of 
housing vouchers. These administrative burdens certainly suggest that the extent 
to which stakeholders will influence voucher household outcomes will be 
determined by the ability of local Public Housing Authorities to gather funds 
from other grants and partners in the private and nonprofit sectors.  
 
 
Policy Recommendations  
My research leads to underlining several possible strategies for local 
Public Housing Agencies to provide more support for landlords as key decision 
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makers in facilitating housing and to protect more tenants from losing their 
housing. Some of these strategies include more effective outreach and education 
to landlords with previous exposure to the program and more targeted 
approaches to recruiting landlords without experience. The findings from this 
study are significant for administrators of the HCVP and stakeholders who have a 
direct influence on regulating the supply and demands of housing. Future 
research should focus on understanding the roles of housing market actors in 
providing collective opportunities for planning, policy, and community 
development. 
 
Propose and Pass Policies that Ban Discrimination Based on Housing 
Choice Vouchers 
 As my interview data present the persistence of discrimination based on 
source of income in more subtle ways despite fair housing laws, the City of 
Pasadena must adopt policies to prevent voucher households from contributing 
towards the count on chronic homelessness in Los Angeles County. My findings 
provide several perspectives on the role of landlords in the HCVP: 1) landlords 
are likely to use the same social and financial criteria designed for market rate 
tenants when selecting voucher tenants, 2) bureaucracy limits participation from 
landlords, and 3) landlords have varying levels of experience and knowledge 
about the HCVP. Though it’s still unclear whether formerly homeless populations 
in Pasadena experience homelessness more than once, it is possible for such 
results considering the lack of housing supply and rent control in Pasadena.  
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Most neighborhoods in Pasadena are overburdened, and so the AMI from 
which the ceilings of Housing Choice Vouchers are calculated must effectively 
represent the fluctuating median incomes of each neighborhood. Proposed 
policies must avoid bureaucratic processes to attract more market actors to the 
program. Paperwork intensive processes limit participation such that the leased 
unit is left vacant and the landlord cannot receive any payments until the voucher 
tenant has moved in. While some housing advocates have explained that most 
experiences with landlords regarding receiving the first payment have ended 
positively, there other times that landlords were frustrated and had bad 
experiences offering housing to voucher recipients. More often than not, 
landlords choose to rent to market rate tenants because they fit the criteria of the 
community. Rather than creating more incentives for landlords through 
mitigation funds, housing outcomes could result in permanent housing if 
approaches to limit the number of requirements and potential risk from financial 
losses for landlords are taken more seriously for areas with high AMI. Taking on 
this perspective may be helpful for housing officials in their objectives to recruit 
more landlords who understand the various roles of the program and their 
impacts on voucher households. In addition, this perspective may open questions 
about the need for the housing vouchers in Los Angeles County to be based on the 
AMI of each city or neighborhood in the county. A Los Angeles County wide AMI 
standard for voucher household eligibility has shown to not lead to lower 
numbers of chronic homelessness.  
 
Active Landlord Outreach and Continued Education 
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  Given the design of the HCVP, landlords are often the first point of 
contact for housing searches and issues. Based on the findings in this study, 
various perspectives from landlords on the administration of the HCVP are 
dependent on their past experience working with voucher tenants. In some cases, 
landlords were willing to offer more flexibility than most tenants expected. 
Despite that the results of such actions generate a stable source of income for 
landlords, outreach would clarify and inform landlords what kinds of housing 
practices are appropriate for maintaining housing for low-income households. 
However, there are challenges to ensuring that landlords are more knowledgeable 
and experienced in the program. The proposed presidential budget announced 
about a month ago poses looming obstacles for the administration of the HCVP. 
Without CDBGs funding local communities, they are at risk of urban and poverty 
decline. In addition, the HCVP in Pasadena is expected to lose nearly all of its 
funding, $1.7 million in grants for homeless services and local community 
development. Therefore, nonprofit housing organizations and private 
developments must come together to be able to compensate for the lack of 
resources that local Public Housing Authorities will have to recruit and 
strategically approach landlords. It becomes important for stakeholders to share 
similar goals to reduce discrimination against Housing Choice Vouchers, provide 
much needed housing services such as financial assistance and disability services, 
and generate conversations about how the community can compensate for deep 
administrative burdens. Therefore, local housing authorities must push the 
federal efforts of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to 
alleviate homelessness in urban cities. 
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 The roles of stakeholders have the potential for causing tenant outcomes. 
Because there are variations in the exposure of landlords to the HCVP, the 
outreach and education provided by the housing officials are significant in their 
decision to participate. The administrative burdens placed on the placement and 
inspection processes serve as disincentives for landlords that hold a profit-driven 
perspective. Landlords holding this perspective for voucher tenants are likely to 
not understand the reasons for such bureaucracy. Additionally, as compliance is 
the only important criteria for inspectors, some local Public Housing Authorities 
do not form transparent relationships with landlords. Landlords become further 
frustrated over the amount of time that goes transferring voucher households 
since their unit remains vacant until this process is completed. On the other 
hand, housing advocates expressed that most of their experiences with landlords 
in these situations did not lead to further issues. Because housing advocates 
approach landlords with a strategic approach to ensure that these frustrations do 
not hold any actual threat to their financial returns, housing advocacy 
organizations can soften the relationships between landlords and housing 
officials to extend beyond compliance. This form of outreach and exposure to 
landlords may allow for more transparency about the processes driving the 
program and the families behind the financial circumstances. If local Public 
Housing Authorities were to successfully connect with housing advocates, the 
services and outreach that housing advocacy groups can provide may be able to 
alleviate the administrative burdens and lack of resources that housing officials 
are expected to experience. 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, there are more than several cases exhibiting the impact of 
interactions between stakeholders in the HCVP. Voucher tenant outcomes are 
related to not only a greater economic context but also the social structures and 
systems that prevent households from accessing communities with greater 
opportunities. In order for discrimination based on one’s source of income and 
race to be completely eliminated, it will require city, state, and federal efforts to 
preserve permanent housing and prevent stakeholder interactions from affecting 
the number of voucher households turning over to the chronic homelessness 
count.  
 By taking a closer look at the housing actions and perspectives of 
stakeholders, it is clear that there are multiple contexts and relationships 
contributing to tenant outcomes. While passing policies to prevent 
discrimination is significant to increasing and maintain the number of voucher 
households, my findings show that it is equally important to consider the impact 
of administrative burdens on tenant outcomes. Therefore, it is important for 
extra support in the form of housing services and case mangers to be involved in 
managing stakeholder relationships. There must be ways in which local Public 
Housing Agencies can expand their limited resources to develop supportive 
housing into permanent housing for voucher households.  
 The purpose of this research extends as far as providing perspectives on 
the interactions and roles of stakeholders in the HCVP. It can provide some of the 
motivations that landlords have for their participation and explain the perceived 
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roles of stakeholders and their relationships. Moreover, research on the market 
actors of the HCVP shows that they hold significant, key decision-making 
capabilities for voucher household outcomes. Further research on the 
interactions of market actors and their impacts can provide an important starting 
point for creating and sustaining more supportive communities.  
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